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Abstract
Agricultural policies in both Europe and the United States provide
conmodities with an excessively high and distorted pattern of support. The
economic interdependencies of the policies give rise to adverse fiscal and
economic costs, which are viewed as disharmonies in the existing policy
measures both within and between the two regions. Unilateral and
simultaneous EC and U.S. policy changes are simulated with an international
trade model. They are carried in three steps: (1) grains and feeds, (2)
beef and dairy, and (3) sugar. Both cross effects and own effeets are
examined on typical policy targets. Results suggest that while world
prices are sometimes drastlcally altered, the nagnitude of cross effects is
snall and sometimes arnbiguous compared to own effects. Feed livestock
linkages are dominant factors in the economic rationale behind the
interactions between countries. The case for cooperation in this trade
game is, however, supported by the evidence from at least a budget point of
view.
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BIId,TERAL HARMONIZATION OF EC AND U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the oil shocks the agricultural sectors in most
countries have suffered from a long and deep crisis, although the timing of
events, the economic factors at work and the adjustment of policies have
been quite different in various areas. The European Community (EC) and the
united states (u.s.), as rnajor producers and traders of agricultural
products, have played a major part in the development of these events. In
the European Community farrn incomes were depressed after the first oil
shock. This was mainly due to a cost squeeze effect from high rates of
inflation. EC policy makers have tended to'alleviate these problems by
continuing the price support policies, being somewhat lured by the high
world prices of the early seventies. In the late seventies price supports
were curtailed but the donmward pressure on prices was somewhat relieved in
the early eighties after the second oil shock. In recent years high budget
costs, growing exportable surpluses and rarge public stocks have again
strengthened this pressure.
The U.S. had very good years in the seventies as real commodity priees
rose with trade volumes expanding, thanks to a weak dollar and a world
demand not yet choked by the induced implications of Èhe oil boom and the
subsequent economic slack. As the prospects turned around, the 1980s
became unbearable as well in the U.S. and the costs of farm programs have
moved to record levels.
Under these circumstances great hopes have been placed by many
countries in the GATT negotiations, expecting a significant contribution
from a better discipline of international trade behavior. It is quite
visible that exporting countries are more active, display more efforts to
alleviate trade barriers, and argue for free trade as a desirable target.
The U.S. appears to be part of that group. Other countries which are
either importers or have inward looklng agricultural policies exhibit much
less enthusiasm to see action taken. The EC clearly belongs to the latter
group as its policies were designed for a net importing situation while it
has now inadvertently become a net exporter of many commodities. A lot of
external pressure is now exerted on the EC as this net exporting situation
is viewed as lacking legitimacy since it is largely due to protectionist
policies.
As a result of these developments EC-U.S. agricultural trade relations
have become tense over the last fdw years, to a degree rarely attained
before. Two dimensions seem to emerge in the context of the EC-U.S. trade
conflict. One is the domestic political economy of agricultural policy
rnaking which is a widespread feature of developed countri." b".oming more
protectionist for agriculture as they get richer (Honrna and Hayami, 1986).
The other is the international dimension of farn policies. Countries with
large trade shares cannot ignore both the consequences of partner policies
on their own agricultural targets, nor the effects of cheir own programs on
other countries' success or failure to achieve their objectives. This
interdependence creates an externality of a probable significant size that
is induced by policies which are often designed only for domestic purposes
and urainly driven by dornestic forces, but which impact other actors in the
world agriculÈural trade game. In that context iu is certainly appealing
Èo view freer trade as a public good since some paËsive actors cannot be
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excluded from potential gains (Runge, et al. , L987 ; Ruttan and von lJitzke,
L987) .
In this paper we view the EC-U.S. relations in a game framework, where
they are both active players with defined strategies and where the rest of
the world is essentially passive although not unaffected, since it
Participates in world price and trade formation. An attempt is made Eo
characterize the nature of the game of the trade war or policy cooperation
between the EC and the U.S. While aggressive actions were envisaged in a
previous study (MahË, et al., rgBT), the design of strategies, i.e.,
policy options, analyzed in the present work was geared Èoward discovering
areas for cooperation between the two trading partners while contributing,
at the same time, to the solution of domestic problems. In that sense a
whole set of conceivable strategies will not be covered and only a partial
characterization of the u.s.-EC agricultural trade game will be
illustrated.
The policy opÈions taken under consideration were defined in the
context of the study launched by the EC Comnissionl on "Disharmonies in EC
and u.S. Agricultural Policies". The concept of "disharmony" in
agricultural policy measures in this context is viewed in a rather wide
perspective (EEC, l-988, chap. 2). A disharmony exists whenever ,ra seÈ of
policies have not reached their objectives given existing constraintsr'.
The concept is not seen as being equivalent to uneven rates of protection
or to price distortions. rnstead, the policy targets are expected to be
better fulfilled by reducing the overall level of support and narrowing the
range of support rates provided to various commodities.
lrt should be made clear that in the analysis described here,
views are those of the authors and not of the EC comrnission.
3
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It seems fairly easy to trace back the origin of the budget costs and
of other costs of both EC and U.S. agricultural policies to the generally
high level of price support prevailing over the recent years. But a
significant part of these costs are also due to existing inconsistencies
within policy programs. Some of Èhem, for example, relate to uneven rates
of support granted to close substitutes either in production or in final
and intermediate consumption. Everyone knows the famous case of grains
substitutes, but there are many other distortions of this kind when a
cross-cornmodity viewpoint is taken in assessing agricultural policies.
Harmonization in the present context consists of an adjustment of EC
and U.S. policies in three2 steps dealing successively with (1) grains and
feeds , (2) meat and dairy, and (3) sugar. The inplieations of these'policy
changes on various policy targets are evaluated for each possible
combination of actions of the tvro partners. Estimates of both ovr4 and
cross effects of the policy changes allow uncovering acceptable or
attract,ive cornbinations of strategies for both countries. As a consequence
the issue of coordination of policy reforms as opposed to isolated actions
are assessed within our framework.
Section 2 describes the existing situation of disharmonies as related
to protection rates, and the actual context of the contemplated policy
options. In Section 3 some features of the model used and of the problems
of inplenentation are highlighted. Section /+ is devoËed to the simulaLion
results with emphasis placed on the economic rationale behind interactions
2In th" original Study a fourth step dealt with fats which are not
4
considered here (CEE, 1988)
between EC and U.S. policies and on the opportunity for both countries to
act jointly.
II. EXISTING DISHARMONIES IN POLICIES
AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR HARMONIZATION
Disharmony is not equivalent to even rates of support and even rates
of protection do not imply even rates of support. However the large gap
between existing rates of protection provided to commodities are likely to
induce undesired budget costs and welfare losses. Reducing some of these
Baps, while cutting down on the general level of support, is expected to
bring significant budget savings and welfare gains.
'In Figure 1 are displayed estimates of protection rates for
connodities covered in the present study. They can serve as a basis to
discuss briefly some of the major disharmonies3 existing in both EC and
u.s. agricultural policies. The price distortions induced by these
unbalanced rates of support across corîmodities have both domestic and
international implications, so that perverse effects of domestic policies
may cross the border and the cost of a disharmony may be externalized to
trade partners.
rn the European community one major well-knovrn area of priee
distortion is the grain-oilseeds-feed (GoF) sector (de veer, 1986; Mahé,
1984). High grain prices and zero tariffs on oilseeds and meals as well as
on so-called grain substitutes have induced a rnajor substitution of
imported feeds for European produced grains in the compound feed sector.
3A broader picture of existing disharmonies may be found in EEC,Chapters 3 and 4.
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1988,
1 Figure 1. EC and U.S. Ratelof ProtectLon (1986).
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Grain exports have been further enhanced and the cost of restitutions has
increased. In order to improve the level of self-sufficiency in vegetable
protein us'ed in animal feed, the EC has also developed what amounts to a
deficiency payments system on oilseeds to promote import substitution. As
production grew, so did the costs to CAP budget. As can be seen in Figure
1, oilseeds have now become even more protected than grains and the
downward pressure on grain support prices has shifted the budget burden
from grain to the cost of expanded oilseeds production. In this GOF
subsector price distortions occur between commodities which are close
substitutes in both production and derived demand.
There are also likely distortions between feed pricing and livestock
products pricing in the Community. Cheâper imported proteins are not quite
consistent with the highly protected dairy sector nor wirh rhe highly
supported meat products. This has added to the fast growing surplus
problem of dairy products in Europe and also induced artificial diff.t"rr.."
in competiÈiveness between regions and member states. As a consequence,
national interests have made it unfeasible to design a common strategy to
attack this problem at the EC level, hence Ëhe long-lived status quo.
EC's sugar policy is also a stereotype cornbination of instruments
designed to avoid some perverse effects arising from the initial high price
support policy. Import quotas from so-called ACP countries (Africa,
caribbean, Pacific) coexist with a costly export subsidy program, while a
producer's lewy on both A and particularly B producers' quota are used to
alleviate budget cost. The overall outcorne is a large consumer cost and
pervasive aËtemPcs to stop other sr^reeteners from substit'uting for beet or
cane sugar in the food industry.
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The U.S. programs are also characterizedby price distortions that
irnpact on budget and welfare. A target price significantly higher than the
loan rate makes the budget quite sensitive to world prices and to the
strength of the dollar as the early eighties have demonstrated. The
absence of a target price scheme in the soybean programs tends to
stimulate the substitution of corn for soybeans, thus making soybeans and
soybean by-products more expensive relative to feed grains in animal feed.
As in the case of the EC, the U.S. has an inconsistency between the non-
supported price of feeds and the highly protected dairy sector. This
situation will hamper the efficiency of supply control measures of the
dairy sector.
Another typical and fairfy fax reaching distortion lies in the beet
and can sugar program in the U.S. This sector, highly protected through
irnport quotas, has experienced deereasing market shares as the competiEion
from corn sl4teeteners was fostered by relatively cheap 
"ot., prices at the
user level.
The latter case illustrates how the internaÈional linkages tend to
'rexport't the perverse effects of these disharmonies. The U.S. sugar (and
alcohol) program stimulates the production of byproducts of the sweeteners
industry, i.ê., corn gluten feed, which cannot compete with cheap feed
grains in the U.S. buc are sucked into the EC because of high user grain
prices. Hence a further aggravation of EC unbalances and surpluses. This
is a case where disharmonies in trro countries seem to fuel each other
resulting in high cosÈs for everybody. Adverse effects of EC and U.S.
di-sharmonies in price supports are also transmitted to other counËries like
New Zealand, BrazLL, Argentina and other developing countries whose economy
cannot affqrd Èhe taxes to support agriculture.
B
The foregoing analysis of existing disharmonies paves the way to
design changes likely to bring savings and social benefits to both
partners. The rationale behind the three policy options described in
Table l- should be evident frorn the analysis sketched above, although the
magnitude of the changes reflects on intuitive assessment of balaneed and
feasible packages rather than a strict economic rationale.
Option 1 implies a ehange of a single policy instrument in rhe U.S.4
In the case of the EC, Option 1 already includes a balanced package aiming
at improving EC's situation and providing some relief to U.S. problems as
well; hence the large cut in grain and oilseeds producer's priee support
and the sma1l border tax on imported feeds. This option is also expected
to be acceptable from the U.S. point of view as it involves a large cut in
EC's grain restitutions.
The design of policy options also embodies concerns about cross-
cornmodity effects, input-output price distortions and, in particular, feed
livestock interactions. This is why pork and poultry prices are cut and
dairy quota is kept active in EC for Option 1, to prevent creating perverse
effects in partial moves toward harmonization. It is quite clear that
without the latter features in Option 1 a significant part of the benefits
would have been lost through leakages as the costs of existing policies in
the animal sector would increase.
Option 2 further strengthens the balance of support by cutting prices
for dairy and all meats. Budget savings are expected from avoiding a shift
of resources (including land) to even more costly comrnodities. This
4A t"tg"t price for soybeans was considered initially but later
abandoned due to budget costs.
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Table 1. Definition of Policy Options
Three active options are considered for each country beside the passive one.
They are made with packages which cumulates from I to 3. Table 2 summarizes
the main features.
Table 1 - Definition of Simulated Options
Option 0
Option 1
. grains
. pork and
poultry
Option 3 -
. sugar
oilcakes and
veg. proteins
cereal
substitutes
pork and
poultry
milk, sugar
7 p.c. (support price)
quota active
Option 2 : Option 1 and in addition:
. beef - 1-5 p.c. (supp.price)
. milk - 25 p.e" (supp.priee)*
EC
no ehange
- 20 percent (support
price)
+ 1-0 percent tariff
- 20 percent (support price)
+ 10 p.c. tariff
2 p.e. (supp.price)
u. s.
no change
- l0 percent(target price)
Loan Rate follows
world prices
no change
no change
import quota
no protection
- 25 p.c. (supp
Price ) *
no change
30 p.c. on the
support price
Option 2 and in addition:
- 40 p.c. on the A
quota price
*effective producer price falls by only 20 percent in the EC because of an
assumed 5 percent rent due to the quota. Effecuive eonsumer price falls by
less than 25 percent (narnely 20 in Èhe EC, L8 in the U.S.) since domestic
consumption subsidies are abandoned except for veal feed.
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approach follows the pereeived necessity to design policy changes with a
global perspective on the sector. Such a comprehensive approach is
neeessary to avoid perverse effects of partial measures eorrecting some
distortions while others are kept, as suggested by the seeond best theory.
Option 3 pursues the equilibration of supports or at least correcËs
some gaps created by previous changes. Sugar price supports are eut
drastically to avoid increasing the rent on the A sugar quota and further
distortions between grains and sugar prices as a result of Options 1 and 2.
In both EC and U.S., significant consumer gains are also expected.
It is not obvious from the starting point thac both countries would
benefit from the complete implementation of the options. The two partners
may not like equally a given step of the harmonization process. And it may
be that one partner would prefer some combination of options and the other
a different one. The outcomes of all possible combinations of options from
no change (Option 0) to full harmonization must be analyzed. Then, upon
consideration of different.policy targets like1y equilibrium positions can
be uncovered, corresponding to the outcomes of a negotiation which would
follow the rules of the game defined here. Table 2 sxyLizes the 16
possible solutions of the process. While the first row describes a
unilateral EC movement toward harmonization, the first column corresponds
Uo an isolated U.S. move. The diagonal displays the outcomes of joint
action which can be contTasted with single-country harmonization in either
EC or U.S.
l_ l_
Table 2. The structure of the combined options in the "harmonization game"
EC Harmonizes in the subsectors
None
Grains
and
feed
1
Beef
and
dairy
2
Sugar
30
United States
harmonizes in :
None 0
Grains and feed 1
Beef and dairy 2
Sugar 3
(0, 0 0
1
2
3
(
(
(
(
)
)
)
)
1
1
1
1
0
1
2
3
0
0
0
1
2
3
(
(
(
2
1
2
2
)
)
)
)
(0,3)(r,2)(2,3)(3,3)
III. MODELLING INTERACTIONS BETI,IEEN EC AND
U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN A CA.I.TE FRAMEi'ORK
The various combinations of options in Table 2 were simulated with the
trade model MISS,.with cross checks made with the OECD MTM model,
particularly for world price changes in the main scenarios.
MISS is a simplified world trade rnodel whieh allows for comparative
static analysis of policy changes around a base situation. In Thompson's
terminology it is a non spatial price equilibrium model. When policy
changes occur for one or several cornmodities in one or many countries, the
nodeL firsu solves for the new supply and demand levels and for the world
price changes which bring the net world excess supply back to zero. Budget
cost, farm income and other indicators for each'economic zone are
calculated in a simplified fashion. Trade flows between the economic zones
cannot be calculated by lhis rnodel.
L2
The behavior of the model is led by matrices of direct and cross-price
elasticities of agricultural supply, of derived demand for feeds, and of
final demand. Domestic prices can be either exogenously fixed or linked to
world prices by protection rates as in the case of fixed ad valorem
tariffs, subsidies, taxes; shifts of supply, demand, or exchange rates can
also be performed.
A. Scope and Parameters
The basic model is more fully described in Mahâ and Moreddu (1986) but
it has been revised for the present exercise (see Mahâ, et al., l_9gg). rn
the current version it covers four zones: EC, u.s., rest of the world
market economies and centrally planned economies (CPE). The latter are
supposed to be unresponsive to world price changes. Therefore, only market
economies are involved in world price adjustments to EC and/or U.S. poticy
changes, but the assumption made on CPE countries increases world price
sensitivity to policy changes in EC and U.S.
The basic data include a balance sheet for each zone and each product
and the levels of protection for the reference period which is in the
present case a "representative 1985". Seven comrnodity groups are included:
(1) cereals (wheat and coarse grains), (2) oilcakes, (3) cereal substitutes
(nillings and other vegetal byproducts, corn gluten feed, manioc and citro-
pulp), (4) beef mear, (5) pork and poulrry, (6) milk, and (7) sugar. Ir
should be clear that the aggregation of all "substitutes', may raise some
problems of interpretation since they actually differ in (a) their
currently existing protection rate; (b) their energy-protein ratio; and
(c) their production conditions and therefore supply elasticities (manioc
vs. corn gluten feed). But in the options defined in the Study, policies
affecting imported components are changed mostly in a parallel fashion.
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B. Model Calibration and Choice of Elasticities
Supply and demand price elasticities are shown in Annex Table l. They
are derived from a review of estimates used in other studies and adjusted
in the Study group. Although there is no time scale in a eomparative
static model, the magnitude of supply response must be calibrated with a
time horizon in mind. It was a medium term 3 to 5 years in the present
case
More consistency in the choice of the parameters r\tas looked for in
order to improve the behavior of the model. This consistency may be
improved, first, by using the homogeneity and symnetly properties of the
output supply and derived demand system (Sakai, Diewert); second' by making
use of teehnieal knowledge like complementarity between beef and milk in
Europe, and substitution or independence in the U.S. Attention was also
given to the coherence between animal products response to their own prices
and derived demand for feed response to these same prices. This has been
made easier in MISS by disCinguishing feed demand from food demand.
The approach consists of starting with a variable profit function, for
the whole sector with the seven included outputs plus one for the rest of
agriculture and four feed items (grains, vegetal proteins, grain
substitutes plus two other inputs for cornpleteness of variable intermediate
consumption). Primary factors are assumed fixed for the whole sector
except for capital. The shares of outputs and variable inputs in variable
profit have been estimated for EC and U.S., adding grains fed on farm to
the feed cost reported in the accounts and to the final output in order to
capture their full cost-derived demand effect. Because of the
substitutability between outputs in European agriculture, the elasticities
1,4
were assumed fairly large which is in line with results from various
econometric studies when cross effects are included. Large cross effects
were often found ln estimation work done on the agricultural sector in
France. Slight output substitution between crops and grazLng livestock is
assumed in Europe, less so in the U.S. A large substitutability is assumed
between crops and a beef-milk complementarity is introduced in Europe
(substitutability in the U.S.). These assumptions brought elasticiries in
line with expected orders of magnitude. The relationships between animal
products and feed elasticities made use of the knowledge of the intakes of
grain, cakes and substitutes by each species estiïated in another study
(Mahâ and Munk, 1988). The elasticities of derived demand for feed with
respect to liwestock products prices rÀrere deduced from its own and cross
supply elasticicies of these animal products weighted by corresponding
input shares in total use (locally constant proportions). The syrunetry
condition provided the effect of feed priees on output supply. The outcome
suggests that while substitution exists between individual feed items when
total feed is constant, input substitutability decreases sharply when the
outPut effect due to animal supply response to feed cost is included as in
this full model matrix. The more so as \re deal with aggregated groups of
ingredients, and as the behavior is meant to represent mediurn run response.
This is in line with what Sakai calls a normal technology.
For the rest of the world, cross effects were dropped because of
little knowledge and because natural conditions often differ from Europe
and the U.S.A. smaller direct elasticities were chosen as a consequence.
The parameters used are assumed relevant for the rnedium term and are given
in Annex Table 2, their magnitude is sornewhat ln line with those of the
1_5
OECD rnodel and of Valdés and Zi,etz (1-980). Published estimates of import
demand elasticity vary over a wide range aecording to methods and
speeification (Gardiner and Dixit, 1987). The information collected by
these authors suggests that direct estimation leads to a smaller import
demand elastieity (in the case of U.S. grain exports) than the one implied
by deriving it from supply and demand elasticities.
C. Policv Formulation and Model Outputs
There is a real challenge in maintaining a simulation tool which can
aceornmodate many policy instruments which differ from one commodity to the
next and also often coexisting in the same program for a given commodity.
The model MISS was originally designed lo simulate policy changes expressed
as ad valorem tariff-equivalents, so that an homogeneous treatment of
cornmodities was possible.
The introduction of variable levies, target price with deficieney
pa1rments, production quotas, import quotas,. consumPtion subsidy,
correspondability l"oy, etc., makes difficutt the task of adjusting the
model system, while keeping its general flexibility.
The rnodel can accomnodate coexisting instruments such as pegged
domestic prices (supply and/ot demand) , production quotas, fixed ad valorem
tariffs, supply-dernand shifts (set aside). In the case of production
quotas, the budget cost, income and consumer surplus changes are
calculated by using the relevant market price changes while supply and
derived demand behavior is led by the effective or shadow price changes.
There arb some difficult cases such as EC's dairy or sugar quotas where a
stock of rent has to be exhausted before actual supply response can take
place. In the case of dairy, a five percent rent is assumed and for sugar
16
the 40 percent gap between A and B prices are treated as a rent so that
supply does not react to the price cut, while only demand does. The
capability to peg or alter domestic prices leads to an assumption of zero
elasticity of price transmission frorn world to dornestic prices in the
relevant cases. For other commodities, as for soybeans5 in the U.S. (both
supply and demand) or oilseeds in the EC (only demand side), domestic
prices follow proportionally world prices.
There are no storage costs in the model. Excess supply has to be
financed either by export subsidies, foreign donations or delayed
deficiency payments (PIK program). In the U.S. , the set-aside program r4ras
specified as an export supply shift on the bases of external information
(e.9., Meyers, et al.; Gardiner; OECD). In the EC, the complex sugar
policy is specified in an ad hoc fashion, so as to reflect mainly the
relevant budget savings6 and income losses.
The farm income indicator used is the value added, i.e., the
difference between total sales and feed and other purchased inputs. It is
assumed that the prices of commodities excluded from the study are
unchanged as well as the prices of intermediate consumption other than
feed. The proeedure used to calibrate the supply system allows one to make
the relevant calculations. Resources are shifted toward the "rest of
agriculture" and income effects are dampened as a consequence. Budget
costs are calculated with a simple formula which is directly applieable
5rf 1o"., rates had been pegged in the u.s., EC's influence on Èhe u.s.
soybean program would have shifted fron farm income to the budget.
6In the case of sugar the export refunds corresponding to ACP import
quota lrere not considered as a part of the domestic sugar regime cost (but
development aid).
L7
when policy instruments are support prices, corresponsibility levies,
deficiency paJrments, tariffs or export refunds. Consumer surplus changes
are calculated in the craditional Marshallian way. The welfare indicator
is the sum of the transfer changes (producer, consumer' taxpayer).
D. Estimation of Protection Rates. Domestic and "World" Prices
For each product and each zorre, protection rates representative of the
protection provided to producers, to animal feed uses and to human
consumption are calculated. EC and U.S. proteetion rates are calculated
for the year 1986, except for sorne cases where the year 1985 was used due
to lack of more recent data. The results of these estimations are reported
in Annex Table 3.
Two meÈhods are used to derive the protection rates. In the case of
price suppoït progïams that directly lead to budget expenditures or budget
receipts (deficiency payments, variable import levies, export subsidies,
etc.), government spending data are used to calculate the corresponding
protection rates. For policies such as import or production quotas where
the gap between domestic and world prices is not reflected by budget
expenditures, protection rates are generally approximated by a ratio of
domestic to border prices.
IV. MAIN RESULTS OF HARMONIZATION OF EC AND U.S. POLICIES
It is out of the scope of this paper to analyze in detail the supply
demand, trade, price, etc., changes for eaeh country--product--opËion
combination. Only the essential effects on selected policy targets are
surmarized in Table 3.
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A. Ovm Effects and the Economics of Harmonization (first row; first
column)
I^Ihen EC moves alone toward Option 3, quite significant changes occur
in both the domestic and the world markets. Option 1 (0,1) grain surpluses
disappear in the EC, which drives world prices up by over 5 percent. The
tariff on oilcakes and grain substitutes, together with the cut in pork and
poultry prices, depress the demand for imported feed and world prices of
oilcakes and substitutes drop, particularly for the latter which are mainly
by-products. As Option (0,1) involves some offsetting factors (cheaper
grains but more expensive cakes and substitutes, limited animal sector
expansion) trade and income effects are not very large. Budget savings are
significant.
Option (0,2) brings about the largest changes from EC's point of view
because the animal sector is deeply affected. As a consequence feed demand
in the EC is driven further down and world prices for cakes and grain
substitutes d.rop sharply, while the price of cereals recedes from the
level reached in option (0,1). The costs of grain and oilseeds programs
increase somewhat from step 1 as the cut in animal production has resËored
the grain surplus. Huge EC budget savings take place on the costly beef
and dairy market regimes as the EC moves from a surplus to a net importer
position. These adjustments drive world prices up drastically for these
two products. Incomes suffer a steep decline (rninus 16 billion ECU) and
Èhe trade balance deteriorates significantly. consumers gain up to 1-L
biLlion ECU and overall welfare improves by about 5 billion.
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I,rrhen option 3 is implemented in the EC, worl-d priees for sugar rise
(4 percent) but not much happens on the budget, although a significant
transfer takes place frorn producers to consumers (part of the rent on the A
quota).
Altogether, our results suggest that policy harmonization in EC up to
Option 3, greatly alters world price ratios. First, between feed grains
and other feed ingredients; second, between feeds and livestock products.
Sugar prices do not respond much due to the sizeable rent on the EC quota.
For the EC, Option 2 carries the largest implications for both the European
farm sector and for world markets. Noticeably, when the EC undertakes such
a reduction of the animal sector, world prices of grains and other feeds
are depressed, and the economics of harmonizaÈion appear dominated by the
swinging effects between Option 1 and 2 due to the major feed-liwestock
linkages in European agriculture.
i{hile Option 2 brings about the largest changes to EC when it moves
alone, iÈ is option 1 which produces the largest effects on the U.S. when
the u.s. moves alone as well: nearly 5 billion ECU budget savings and
about 4 billion loss in u.s. farm income. \^rorld prices are not much
altered since partieipation rate almost offsets the effects of the target
price cut. rn option (2,0) the u.S" lowers dairy prices, and imports are
allowed at the cost of a lewy. significant budget savings occur on
domestic and foreign donations of dairy products. since grain exports
increase as a result of smaller feed demand, the crop programs cost more
than in option (1,0), partly offsetting the savings made on dairy. This
option brings about large transfers between farm income and consumers
(about 4 billion ECU). Worl-d prices are affected mainly in the case of
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dairy products (16 percent), feed-to-dairy products price ratios are deeply
altered and feeds also become somewhat cheaper relative to beef.
In Option (3,0) the U.S. would cut sugar support price and allow sugar
imports to flow-in with the relevant tariff. No large budget saving oceur,
but again, significant transfers take place from producers to consumers.
l,Iorld prices move up by about 4 percent, an amount similar to the effect of
EC sugar price eut.
When each country harmonizes separately world prices are significantly
altered and often in the same direetion. When both countries move in
concert, world price changesT tend to cumulate, particularly for animal
products, non-grain feeds and sugar, but they tend to offset each other in
the case of grains. These world price changes are the najor components in
the interactions between the Ëwo countries as suggested by the review of
the cross effects.
B. Cross Effects and Simultaneous Harmonization Results
In view of the hot debates and war trade threals between the EC and
the U.S., one might expect that eross effects of policy changes between
countries would be sizeable and that simultaneous harmonization would look
much more attraetive than isolated policy changes. It hardly seems to be
the case except in one instance: the U.S. grain program. The rnain aspects
of interactions between the EC and the U.S, in Èhe harmonization context
can be summarized as follows:
(1) Cross-eountry effects of policy changes are smaller than domestic
effects. This is in line with the observation that domestic policies
TWorld price changes do not exacÈly add up as some changes of policy
instruments occur along the way.
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rather than foreign policies account for the larger part of farm sector
problems.
There are several reasons for that to be expected in spite of the
sometimes drastic world price changes. First, part of the adjustment is
absorbed by the rest of the world. Second, EC and U.S. policies tend to
insulate domestic prices (with a few excepËions). Third, domestic changes
have both volume and price effects while foreign policies have only world
prices effects on the budget. And last, since protection levels are fairly
high in the reference period, the absolute magnitude of world price changes
are smaller than the domestic ones for sinilar percentage variations.
The implications of Ëhese results are chat domestic forces will
probably matter more than foreign pressures, in the adjustment process of
the EC and the U.S. farn policies.
(2) EC's action as defined here, has more influence on the U.S. than
Ëhe converse for most indicators. This is particularly relevant for budget
and farm income. The main reason lies in the U.S. grain program cost which
is sensltive to world prices because of the deficiency payment system. The
U.S. budget benefits from EC's action but farm income is hurt because of
more expensive feed grains and of cheaper soybean prices. U.S. action has
little effect on EC's budget (first column Table 3) except through better
world prices for nilk which brings some savings partly offset by lower
prices for grains and cakes.
(3) Cross effects of EC on the U.S. tend to weaken as EC's
harmonizauion is completed, but the converse is not true. This is mainly
due to the receding dernand for feeds in the EC in Option 2 which restores
EC's position as a grain exporter. This posicive contribution of the
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action of the EC to the U.S. budget would even decrease faster if the
soybean loan rate had been pegged in the U.S. options, since world prices
for cakes dropped by more than 5 percent in Option (0,3).
(4) Cross effects on the budget tend to fade when harmonization is
carried sirnultaneously, they may even change sign in the case of the U.S.
influence on the EC. The cross effect in the first row and first column
are smaller to the ones occurring along the diagonal of Table 3, in spite
of wider and mostly cumulative world price changes. Clearly, the reason is
that as harmonization makes progress, protecLion leve1s and/or exportable
surpluses become smaller, rnaking one country's budget less sensitive to
world price changes due to Ëhe partner's action (see Figure 2).
0vera11, if ernphasis is placed on budget costs, the U.S. might prefer
the EC to move to Option 1 and stay there, but the EC cannot afford to
adjust only the crop secËor. The meat and dairy industries also have to be
harmonized to capture the largest saving potentials. But then the benefit
for the U.S. tends to decline and the advantages of the EC moves becomes
less attractive from the U.S. point of view. If budget savings were the
only policy targets both countries would then move to Option 3. But, if
the partners would focus on other policy targets, other combinations of
options would then become more likely as illustrated in Table 4.
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Table 4. Pollcy Targets and Possible Equilibriun Oprions
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I5. DTSCUSSION - CONCLUSION
The interpretation of these results is made bearing in mind that the
various effecÈs have been simulated in a comparative static framework and
cannot be viewed as projections. In particular, the absence of the tirne
dimension and of technical progress may lead to misinterpretation if the
harmonization steps are just transposed in a dynamic context without
caution. For example, if enough time is allowed, technical progress may
offset price cuts and income would not actually falt compared to now, but
it would falI cornpared to a no-policy change reference.
This aspect is also irnportant for the interactions between country
policies. For example, Option 2 in EC induces a trade reversal for milk
and beef, which makes the u.s. action contribute negatively on the EC
budget (lower lewy proceeds); such an adverse effect would not occur if EC
does not become an importer (as in the first column in Table 3, which would
likely be the case if the price cut is spread over several years).
Another issue ls the s.ensitivity of the results of the analysis to the
Parameters of the model. The sensitivity cannot be discussed in general
but only with respect to issues, Income and consumer effects are probably
not very sensitive to mosË parameters and particularly to those of the rest
of the world. The latter arè important for world price reactions. They
seem to be generally larger or in line with results of other studies (OECD,
L987; 1986) but they can be sensitive to the assumed parameters for the
rest of the world for which a satisfactory empirical basis is lacking.
Some particular EC-U.S. interactions are sensitive Èo the world price
response, particularly since the balance of rnany offsetting components is
snall in most cases. As the u.s. budget is sensitive to EC,s policy
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changes affecting grains, world price response of grains is an important
assumption.
One may think thaÈ world prices would react more, particularly in the
short run, increasing the magnitude of the interactions, but if the rest of
the world parameters are meant to be relevant for the shorter run, the
domestic parameters should be adjusted down accordingly and supply
considered as inelastic. One may also consider that world markets are
segmented due to imperfect competition and that price would be more
volatile than reflected in such a price equilibrium model. But, the
eontemplated policy adjustnents are relevant to the longer run where tTade
flows can adjusË rather easily if outlet opportunities become available (as
Èhe grain substitutes problem of the EC seems to confirm).
Some particular results may then be sensitive to assumption. However,
the conclusion that domestic policies are more important than the partner's
policies seems particularly robust, as well as the greater influence of EC
on the U.S. budget than the converse, mainly because of the crop deficiency
payment scheme, which is less insulating than most other U.S. and EC farn
programs.
llith these qualifications in nid and if budget savings are given a
great irnportance, the case for cooperation of both partners in adjusting
their policies simultaneously appears to be rather clear and the fact that
mutual benefits are larger at Ëhe beginning of the Process nay help
iniÈiate negotiations in a constructive spirit.
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